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Summary  findings
In this theoretical analysis, the "principal" can be the  civil service pay scale that is too flat and rigid), he cannot
head of the tax collection agency (or "government" or  really reward good employees or make dishonest
even citizens), the "supervisor" can be the tax collector,  employees suffer.
and the "agent" can be the taxpayer.  The analysis assumes that the principal can commit in
The principal, interested in controlling an agent's  advance to a certain likelihood of being caught engaging
socially costly activity ("cheating"), hires the supervisor  in bribery. Creating an independent anticorruption
to save on monitoring costs. The agent may bribe the tax  commission (like those in Hong Kong and New South
collector to suppress reporting, but bribery can be  Wales) may be interpreted  as a way of making such a
eliminated by the agency head if he institutes enough  commitment. In Hong Kong two-thirds of reports to the
investigations and sets rewards high enough and  commission are made in full name, an indication that it
penalties steep enough. When penalties and rewards are  has attained a reputation for independence and
constrained, some corruption will exist even under a  efficiency. The "whistleblower act" in the United States
rational approach to pursuing the agency's objectives.  (promising rewards and protection for informants), as
Anticorruption  efforts will have higher costs than  well as separation of powers and independent courts,
benefits unless they successfully address these constraints.  also function as commitment.
The agency's implementation costs, and thus the scope  Corruption  exists not only in poorly designed but also
for corruption,  are defined by constraints on penalties  in sophisticated systems. It can profitably be reduced
and rewards relative to costs of monitoring  and  only by improving general incentives. Advances in courts,
investigation. For example, if the agency head is  investigations, freedom of the press, and flow of
extremely handicapped in his ability to detect bribery (by  information can allow more performance-based rewards
a high burden of proof and cost of investigation, and a  and penalties.
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"The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be re-
moved from office on impeachment  for, and conviction of (...)  bribery..."
United States Constitution, Art. II, Section 4.
Corruption is an important and pervasive a phenomenon. This is illustrated by the
fact that the United States even included it in the constitution as grounds for impeach-
ment of the president. Also, corruption is long observed throughout human history. As
early as in the fourth century B.C., Kautiliya, Prime Minister of an Indian king, reports
wide-spread corruption.  In our understanding, corruption occurs if a party to a (im-
plicit) contract breaks  it for private gain by side-contracting  with a third person. Thus,
our definition includes collusion in private entities as well as corrupt bureaucracies. 1
The main branch of theoretical literature about collusion within a principal-agent
framework focuses on contracts between a principal and  a privately informed agent.
The principal may employ a supervisor who can obtain information about the agent at
lower costs than the principal. This gives rise to the possibility of collusion  between the
supervisor and the agent. The optimal contract thus maximizes the principal's pay-off
by explicitly considering the possibility of side-contracting between the supervisor and
the agent. In general, if renegotiation between the agent and the principal is not possible
'Our  definition of corruption goes beyond "the use of public office  for private benefit", the definition
used by the World Bank. While "corruption" tends to be associated more with abuse of public office,
"collusion" is more frequently used as a general term.  We will use the  expressions interchangeably.
Corruption  per se is a costly phenomenon only if the joint  benefit to the  side-contracting parties is
lower than  the harm suffered by the  party left out.  While this is the relevant case dealt  with in this
paper, our definition of corruption deals with a broader set of cases.
1after the latter has received the information from the supervisor, a direct mechanism
will be optimal. This means that the supervisor will reveal his information truthfully to
the principal and collusion does not arise in equilibrium. Tirole [12], Laffont & Tirole
[5], Kofman & Lawaree [3] are good examples for these types of models. However, if
renegotiation after the principal has received  the information cannot be ruled out, the
supervisor's anticipation of renegotiation may make the direct mechanism too costly
and collusive behaviour may arise in equilibrium (see e.g.  Lambert-Mogiliansky [6],
Strausz  [11]). Yet a  number of other possibilities why collusion may be  optimal is
developed by Tirole [13]. All the above models have in common that the emphasis lies
on a given informational asymmetry. Technically  speaking, the cited articles cope with
adverse selection problems, because the agent's characterics are exogenous and cannot
be changed by the agent's action.
In contrast, Mookherjee  & Png [8]  consider  corruption in a moral hazard framework.
They model a factory which emits pollution in order to avoid costs and an inspector
who monitors the factory's emission. The inspector discovers the true emission level
with a probability that depends on his effort. If he detects the true emission level, the
possibility of collusion may arise. If the agent and the supervisor collude, they may be
discovered with an exogenously  given probability.  Polinsky and  Shavell [9] employ a
model where the (costly) probability of detecting collusion between the agent and the
supervisor can be chosen by the principal. However,  their model is incomplete as it does
not consider the supervisor's incentives directly. Rather, the supervisor is assumed to
monitor the agent according a probability which is chosen by the principal.
This is the starting point of our work. Employing  a framework  similar to Mookherjee
and Png,  we model three players explicitly.  A principal who offers a  contract  to a
supervisor to monitor the action of an agent.  The agent is supposed to comply with
2regulation but may cheat.  If caught cheating, he either has to pay a penalty or bribe
the supervisor. If collusion takes place, the agent and the supervisor are detected with
a positive probability and both have to pay a fine.
Since the principal chooses the probability of detection of collusion (as well as the
conditions of the contract for the supervisor) at  the first stage of the game, he can
always make collusion unprofitable. Thus, if he chooses not to do so it must be that
it is actually optimal to  "allow" corruption because preventing corruption completely
is more costly. Depending on the parameters chosen by the principal, corruption may
occur.  In general, if penalties can be chosen freely, the optimal contract is such that
corruption never arises.  However, if penalties are bounded, then it might be optimal
to  "allow" some collusion in equilibrium. The reason for this is that  in the collusion-
inducing regime, the expected bribe stimulates monitoring by the supervisor which
in turn  lowers incentives for the agent to cheat.  If the negative impact of increased
cheating on the principal's pay-off is sufficiently  high, then this may overcompensate
the benefits of preventing collusion. In our analysis, we characterize the circumstances
under which the collusion-inducing  regime is optimal.
A necessary condition for corruption to  arise is the possibility of profitable side-
contracting.  In the context of government regulation, the higher the private benefit
of avoiding the regulation, the more is at stake for an agent and thus the more likely
is bribery.  An obvious way to reduce collusion is therefore to reduce regulation.  In
contrast, in our model we take the regulation as given, and then ask for the optimal
implementation within the given framework.
An important aspect is the degree of complexity of the regulation. More complex
regulation has two consequences: First,  it reduces the observability of the action for
3the supervisor thus making it more difficult  to find out whether the agent has complied
with the regulation or not. We model this by varying the supervisors monitoring costs.
Second, as complexity increases, the discretion of the supervisor may increase, leaving
more scope for interpretation in whether the agent complied  with the rule or not.  In our
setting, this can be interpreted as an increase of the bargaining power of the supervisor
relative to the agent.
The paper is organized as follows: Section two develops the basic model, section
three derives the optimal contract in the absence  of bounds on penalties or the payment
made to  the  supervisor.  Section four deals with  upper bounds on penalties or the
payment to the supervisor. Section five examines a situation with bounds on penalties
and the payment to the supervisor. Section six concludes.
2  The  Model
2.1  Basic  Framework
There  are there  persons  involved:  A principal,  an agent  and  a supervisor.  The  agent
can  choose between  two actions,  ac anad  an, where  a,  stands  for  "cheating"  and  an for
"non-cheating".  What  we mean  is simply that  if the agent  chooses  "non-cheating"  he
complies with  the rules which reflect the objectives  of the  principal.  The agent's  utility
depends  on the  action  chosen, where  AUA -UA(aC)  - UA(a)  > 0. That  is, in absence
of any  control  mechanism,  the  agent  has an  incentive to cheat.2
21n contrast to the standard  P-A model, the agent does not receive any wage but simply chooses
between the  two actions.  His "reservation utility"  is thus UA(as) because he  can always guarantee
himself this  utility level by complying with the rules.
4The supervisor is supposed to monitor the action of the agent. He can do so at costs
c8. If he monitors, he discovers the agent's action with certainty. 3 However,  he may
also opt not to monitor in which case his costs are zero. The supervisor makes a report
to the principal. He can report cheating only if he has monitored and found evidence
for cheating. If he reports cheating, the agent has to pay a fine PA.  If the supervisor
hasn't  found evidence for cheating (either he has not monitored or the agent has not
cheated), the supervisor cannot produce evidence of cheating and the agent cannot be
punished.4
Depending on the report that the supervisor makes, he receives  a payment from the
principal.  We assume that  any positive rent that  the supervisor may receive can be
extracted from him ex-ante. 5 Thus, instead of considering the two payments for the
different reports explicitly, we only need to focus on the difference  between the payment
which the supervisor receives when he reports cheating and when he doesn't.  We will
call this the "reward" r.  Also, without loss of generality, the supervisor's reservation
utility is normalized to zero.
If the supervisor has monitored and discovered  cheating, he can be bribed by the
agent. In this case, he reports nothing and receives a bribe b .6
The principal derives utility from the agent's action, Up(a), where AUp  -Up(az)  -
3In a richer model, one could model the supervisor's probability of finding out the  agent's action as
an increasing function of monitoring effort and thus costs. However, as we will see, in equilibrium the
supervisor is going to monitor with a probability smaller than one. Thus, we have a similar effect.
4This is an important  simplification, as it rules out the possibility of extortion:  in our model, the
supervisor can threaten  to report cheating only when cheating and monitoring has occurred.  A model
of extortion can be found e.g. in Lambert-Mogiliansky [6].
5Since the  agent by assumption has to take one action, he is obliged to "participate".  Thus, if he
received a rent, it could not be extracted from him ex-ante. However, we will see that  in equilibrium,
the agent get precisely his "reservation utility" UA(a, 1).
6Note that  we assume here that  the side-contract is enforceable which is in line with the literature.
See Tirole [13]  for a discussion on enforceable  vs. self-enforcing  contracts.
5Up(a,) > 0. Importantly, we assume that  AUp > AUA.  If this was not the case, then
the principal and the agent could raise their joint surplus by direct negotiation and the
supervisor becomes redundant (compare with footnote (1)).7
The principal can detect collusion (if it occurred) through investigation. He chooses
the probability of investigation ir E [0,1] at cost 7rcp. 8 Investigation by the principal will
reveal bribing only. It will  not separately reveal that the agent has cheated. Obviously,  if
bribing is detected, then cheating was a precondition. What we exclude is the possibility
that cheating is detected by the principal directly if bribing has not occurred. 9 Also, we
assume that the principal can commit ex-ante to the probability with which he is going
to investigate. Such commitment is plausible for instance if investment in investigative
capacity is needed. Then, once investigation costs are sunk, the principal will always
have an incentive to carry out the investigation with all possible intensity. Another way
of justifying this assumption is in a repeated game setting.
If the principal has discovered collusion, the supervisor will be fined P5  and the
agent will be fined PB.  All parties are assumed to be risk-neutral.10
The structure of the game is depicted in Figure 1, omitting pay-offs  for notational sim-
plicity: At the first stage of the game, the principal (P) chooses -7r  (as well as penalties
and the reward). Then, agent (A) and supervisor (S) choose simultaneously  whether to
"In  contrast, the standard  "beneficial  grease argument" presupposes that regulation is exogenous. In
that cases, as compliance  with harmful regulation is circumvented,  bribery increases efficiency.  However,
the possibility to extract bribes from agents may motivate bureaucrats to create obstacles. In that  sense,
it can be argued that  the degree of regulation is endogenous (see for instance Kaufmann & Wei [2]).
8To distinguish, we shall call the supervisors action  "monitoring" whereas the term  "investigation"
is reserved for the principal's action.
9As an iUlustration,  consider FBI investigators who are capable to identify corruption in tax author-
ities, but  are not trained to identify tax fraud.  Since in principle the FBI could pursue the latter  by
hiring a supervisor, our assumption amounts to saying that  we do not consider multiple supervisors, an
assumption in line with the  literature.
" 0Our results  extend  to  the  case with  risk  aversion
6p
ir=O  i=l
C  No Cheat
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Bribe  \  No Monitor  Mont  No  Monitor
/  \~~o  Bribe\  \
Investigation  No  Inv.
Figure 1: Extensive form of the game
cheat and to monitor. If the agent has cheated and the supervisor has monitored, they
then play a cooperative game (A,S)over whether and how to collude. We do not model
this explicitly but rather limit ourselves to the outcome which depends on the parame-
ters chosen by the principal in the first stage (see below). Eventually, "Nature" (player
N) decides whether investigation is carried out or not with probabilities 7r  and (1 - 7r).
Consider first the case where the agent has cheated and the supervisor has moni-
tored.  A necessary condition for the supervisor and the agent to collude is that  their
joint surplus from colluding is positive, or
PA  > r + 7r  (PA + Ps)
where  Tr  E  [0,  1] is the probability that  the principal investigates. The left hand side
7denotes the gross gains from collusion,  that is the penalty for cheating which is thereby
saved.  The right hand side are the combined expected costs of collusion, that  is the
foregone  reward and the expected penalties for bribery. Note that we have written the
inequality in a way that collusion takes place if eq.(1) is fulfilled  with equality.11
We assume that all supervisors are willing to accept and all agents are willing  to pay
a bribe with certainty if their respective expected pay-offs  are thereby raised. Thus, the
principal anticipates perfectly for given parameters whether the supervisor and agent
will collude or not, provided the agent has cheated and the supervisor has monitored.'2
The role of the bribe is to distribute the joint surplus so that  both can expect to
gain from colluding. The supervisor wants at least to be compensated for his expected
losses. Thus, if bribing occurs, the bribe can be expressed as
b = k[PA.  -r-7r(PA  + Ps)] + r + 7rPSB  (2)
where k is some number E [0, 1]  representing the bargaining power  of the supervisor and
is given exogenously. A situation where the supervisor can make a take-it-or-leave-it-
offer is represented by k = 1, i.e. the agent is pushed down to his reservation utility. In
contrast, for k = 0, the supervisor's rent from colluding is zero. For 0 < k < 1, both par-
"For  technical reasons, i.e.  to ensure the existence of the  equilibrium, we will assume that  in case
of indifference the  agent and the  supervisor will do whatever the principal wants them  to do.  That
is, if the principal wants to implement the collusion-inducing  regime, the agent and the supervisor will
collude if in principle they  are indifferent.' Likewise, they  will not collude if the  principal wants to
implement the collusion-proof  regime.
12The point that  we want to make here is that  even if all supervisors can be bribed, collusion may
be induced in the optimal contract.  Clearly, if the fraction of honest supervisors is sufficiently high, an
optimal contract  will never be collusion-proof  if preventing collusion is costly. Kofman & Lawaree [4]
construct a model where two types of supervisors, honest and dishonest, exist, whereby the honest type
cannot be  bribed.  They characterize under which circumstances the  non-collusion-proof contract  is
optimal, i.e. how high the fraction of honest supervisors has to be in order to have an optimal contract
which is not collusion-proof.
8ties receive  a positive rent from colluding. We assume that k is known to the principal.13
At the first stage of the game, the principal maximizes his expected surplus by
choosing appropriate values for ir, PA,PB,  PS.  Thereby, he explicitly considers the
game that  is subsequently played by the supervisor and the agent. In choosing param-
eters, the principal takes into account that  collusion may or may not  arise.  In order
to solve the principal's maximization problem, we have to examine the collusion-proof
and the collusion-inducing  regime separately.
2.2  The  Collusion-Proof  Regime
For collusion  not to happen, the supervisor has to have an incentive to report truthfully
if he has found evidence that the agent has cheated. Reversing the inequality in eq.(1)
yields a condition for bribing not to occur, that  is14
PA < r + ir(pA +  P)  (3)
Let us first consider the second stage of the game, that  is, the simultaneous game
played by the supervisor and the agent after the principal has chosen penalties, rewards
and the probability of investigation. Since now by assumption incentives are such that
the supervisor will always report truthfully if he finds the agent cheating, the game can
be represented by the following  normal form:
'3This last assumption is not crucial for our results, but it simplifies the notation substantially.
14Note that  the inequality again includes the case of indifference, so that  collusion does arise if the
agent and the supervisor axe indifferent (compare footnote (11)).
9Agent
Cheating  No Cheating
Superv. Monitoring  UA(ac)  ,  UA(an)
No Monit.  UAac)  p  P)
Figure 2: Collusion-Proofness
For r > cs and PAC  > AUA > 0, the unique Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies.1' 5
Equilibrium probabilities are given by
a=  s  (4)
u UA  (5)
where of E [0,1] denotes the probability that  the agent cheats and ,u E [0,1] denotes
the probability that the supervisor monitors. The subscript cp stands for the collusion-
proof regime. While cheating and monitoring occur with positive probability, bribing
does not since eq.(3) is satisfied by assumption.
Examining eq. (4), if the supervisor's reward is raised, the equilibrium probability of
cheating decreases (in order for the supervisor to remain indifferent between monitoring
or not).  Similarly,  in eq.(5), if PA increases, the equilibrium probability of monitoring
is reduced. Since the agent is indifferent  between cheating or not, his expected pay-off
in both cases is UA(an).  The supervisor is indifferent between monitoring or not, thus
his expected pay-off is zero.
51If PAO  < AUA, then "Cheating'  is a dominant strategy. It is easily verified that this is never optimal
for the principal.  Likewise,  if r  < c8, then  "No Monitoring" is a dominant strategy.  We assume here
that  parameters are such that  this  is never optimal for the principal, i.e.  the  costs of monitoring are
sufficiently  small. If this was not the case, then the problem would become both trivial and unrealistic.
10Let us now go back to the first stage of the game. Since all penalties and rewards
are mere transfers, the joint surplus of all three players is given by'6
V = cr[Up(ac)  + UA(ac)] +  (1 - oj)[Up(an)  + UA(an)] - Cs-  rcp  (6)
Subtracting  the agent's  and the supervisor's expected pay-off in  the collusion-proof
regime and rearranging, the principal's expected pay-off is
VP  =  Up(an)  - cOp[AUP  - AUA] -*C-  - 7rCp  (7)
Thus, the principal's problem in the collusion-proof  regime is given by
max  VP  =Up(an)  - aC[AUP  - AUAI  - A*  - irc  (P1)
PAC  IpAB IpSB  r'I  C
s.t.  r  > PA  -'r'(PA  + PS  )  (NCC)
where ucp and tz* are given by (4) and (5). As we want to compare the solution to this
problem with the collusion-inducing  regime, we defer the solution to the subsequent
sections.
2.3  The  Collusion-Inducing  Regime
Collusion will arise if the  agent and the  supervisor can make themselves better  off
(eq.(1)). For a given probability 7r  of investigation by the principal, the pay-offs of the
agent and the supervisor are as follows,  where the bribe is given by eq.(2):
16Note that  the joint  surplus  as given by eq.  (6) is defined for  all regimes,  not  only the collusion-proof
11Agent
Cheating  No Cheating
Monitoring  UA(a,) -b-7rPXA  |  UA(a,)
Superv.  b)  - C8 7p'  -C 8
No Monitoring  UA aC  UAW  I
Figure 3: Collusion
The mixed strategy equilibrium is determined by the following  equations: 17
Agent:
UA  (ac)  - [b  +  rPA]  =  UA  (a,,)  (8)
Supervisor:
c[b-rPSB]-cS  =0  (9)
Substituting for b, equilibrium probabilities p* and a* are given by
*  =  ~AUA
G=kPAC  + (I -k) [ir(PAB + Ps") + r]  (10)
and
¢c  k[PAC  - 7r(PAB  + PB)] + (1 -k)r  (1
regime.
" 7Again we rule out by assumption parameter values such that  "Cheating" or  "No Monitoring" are
dominant strategies.
12where the subscript c stands for the collusion-inducing  regime.
A number of interesting observations can be made here.  Consider first a rise in PAc
The direct effect on the cheating probability is zero because even if the agent is found
cheating, he never actually pays the fine.  However,  raising the penalty for cheating
raises the bribe which has to be paid by the agent if he is caught cheating. As bribing
becomes more expensive,  for a given probability of monitoring the agent will no longer
be indifferent  between cheating and not cheating but instead prefer the latter one. Thus,
in the new equilibrium, the probability of monitoring must have declined for the agent
again to be indifferent  between his two possible actions. Likewise,  for a given probability
of cheating, as the bribe increases, it is now  more profitable for the supervisor to monitor
rather than not to do so. Thus, in the new equilibrium the probability of cheating must
have decreased.
Raising penalties for bribery has similar effects. Increasing PAB lowers the bribe.
However,  cheating becomes less attractive for a given  probability of monitoring because
the bribe decreases by less than  the expected penalty for the agent increases.  This
makes cheating less attractive thereby lowering  the equilibrium probability of monitor-
ing. Also, for a given probability of cheating the smaller bribe discourages  monitoring
and hence raises the equilibrium probability of cheating. A higher PsB, though raising
the bribe, reduces the probability of monitoring and increases the probability of cheat-
ing in the same way as PAB.
The principal's objective function is now identical to eq.(7) with the exception that
equilibrium probabilities for cheating and monitoring are different. Also, the inequality
of the constraint is now reversed, since the principal implements a regime in which it
pays for the supervisor and the agent to collude. Summarizing, the principal's problem
13is
max  VP =Up(a,)  - 0*[AUp  - AUA] - -%  - rcp  (P2)
s.t. r < pc  _- r(PA + PS)  (CC)
where cr, and It* are given by eqs.(10) and (11).
We are now able to compare both the collusion-inducing  and the collusion-free  case
and can characterize the optimal regime for the principal.
3  Optimal  Contracts  without  Bounds
For unbounded penalties and rewards, we are going to  replicate a  result within our
framework which was first put forward by Becker [1]:
Lemma  1 In the collusion  free regime, a solution to the principal's problem does not
exist. The principal's supremum pay-off is given by
VP = Up  (an)  (12)
and  can  be approximated  arbitrarily  closely for  r - , PA  -+  oo.  Hence cheating  and
monitoring occur in  equilibrium with arbitrarily small probability while investigation
occurs with zero probability. Moreover, the principal's pay-off can never be higher under
any other regime.
Proof:
It is clear by inspecting the principal's objective function in (P1) or (P2) that  a utility
higher than  Up  (an) cannot be attained.  Raising r prompts the agent to  cheat with
14lower probability. This leaves the expected reward and thus the equilibrium probability
for monitoring unaltered. 18 Similarly,  increasing the penalty for cheating prompts the
supervisor to lower his probability of monitoring. This leaves the expected penalty and
thus the equilibrium probability for cheating unaltered.
As long as r  is strictly higher than  PA  , the condition for collusion-proofness  is
fulfilled for any ir  e  [0,1].  Since the principal's objective function is monotonically
decreasing in xr  in the collusion-free  regime, the optimal level of (costly) investigation
for the principal is zero. Thus, if the principal has complete discretion over fines, in the
limit cheating, monitoring and investigation do not occur in equilibrium. An immediate
consequence of this is the following:
Corollary  1 Let the first best be defined as the maximum of the joint surplus of all three
actors given by eq.  (6). For unbounded  penalties and rewards, the first best outcome can
never be reached. It  can be approximated  arbitrarily closely by letting penalties and
rewards go to infinity.
Proof:
First, we need to establish that  the first best cannot be reached under any regime. To
see this, note that the first best levels  of a, y, and 7r  are all zero since AUP-AUA  >  0 by
assumption. This is because investigation as well as monitoring are wasteful activities
in themselves (justified only if they sufficiently  reduce cheating), and therefore do not
occur in the first best which is thus given by Up(an). As we have ruled out parameter
values  such that  "no cheating" and "no monitoring" is an equilibrium at the second stage
of the game (for both regimes), it is not possible that a* = OA IL*  = 0 in equilibrium.
l8The  expected  reward  is o*,Ir  =-c 8 and the  expected  penalty  for cheating  is  graPAO  =  O* AUA.
15Thus,  the  maximum  joint  surplus  can  be  never  be  attained  but  only  approximated
arbitrarily  closely.
4  Optimal  Contracts  with  Bounds  on Penalties  or Reward
4.1  Bounds  on  Penalties
In many  real world circumstances,  the  principal  does not have complete  discretion  over
penalties.  Here,  consider  the  case where  penalties  are bounded  from  above,  that  is,
PA  < PA, PA  P  and PS  <  pB.19  These upper bounds might exist for a variety
of reasons  that  we may  discuss,  but  will not  model  explicitly.  One  consideration  is
that  the  agent's  wealth  will be  a  natural  upper  limit  for  monetary  fines. 2 0 Second,
society  might  impose  (or respect)  bounds  on moral  grounds;  it  can be  hard  to justify
for instance  a death  sentence  for bribery.  Third,  bounds  for penalties  might  be induced
on  efficiency grounds  if higher penalties  need  to be reserved  for the deterrence  of more
severe crimes.21 Fourth,  if cheating  and colluding  is detected  with error,  then  penalties
may  be bounded  to  contain  the  implications  of erroneous  convictions.
Imposing  bounds on penalties  as additional  constraints,  the principal's  maximization
19Cleaxly, for penalties  to  make  "sense'  P  >  5  must  be  satisfied.
20For a explicit  consideration  of non-monetary  penalties  (i.e.  imprisonment),  see  e.g.  Polinsky  and
Shavell  [9].
21See e.g.  Shavell  [10] for details.
16problem can be summarized as follows:
max  Vp  p  Up(a,)  - [AUp - A  UA]  - *CS  -7rCp  (P1') or (P2')
pC  pB  E r i
s.t.  PA <  t
PAB  < PA
pC  < PS
r <Pf-r(PA  + P.  )  (NCC)  or  (CC)
where a* and X+  are given by eqs. (4) and (5) in the collusion-proof  case and by (10)
and (11) in the collusion case. Also, the inequality in the last constraint (NCC or CC)
again depends on the regime considered.
Let us now state our first result for this case:
Proposition  1  For bounded penalties  and an unbounded reward, a solution  to the prin-
cipal's problem  does not exist.
(a)  In the collusion-proof  regime,  The principal's  supremum  pay-off is given  by
VP  = Up(a.)-  --C  (13)
A
and  can  be approximated  arbitrarily  closely for  r  -*  oo.  Thus,  cheating  occurs with
arbitrarily small probability whereas monitoring  occurs with a positive  probability which
is determined  by the upper bound of the penalty.
(b)  The principal's  expected pay-off is never higher in the regime where collusion occurs
compared to the collusion-free environment.
17Proof:
(a) In the collusion-proof case, the principal's objective function is montonically de-
490u  OL*  C  -- C creasing in ,u*  and a'". Since  < 0 and  p  < 0,  in the optimum, PA  = PA  and
r  - 0oo.
(b) The proof is relegated to the appendix.
In the collusion-proof  regime, the expected reward for monitoring will not change
with r since the probability of cheating decreases  proportionally as the reward increases,
thus leaving the equilibrium probability of monitoring unaltered.  Similarly, increasing
the penalty for cheating will reduce the probability of monitoring while leaving the
probability for cheating unaltered.  However, this  can only be done up to  the upper
bound, hence monitoring occurs with positive probability.
The intuition for the second part of the proposition is as follows. By inspection of
the principal's objective function it is clear that in both regimes the optimal reward is a
high as possible. However,  if the reward is too high compared to the penalties, bribery
becomes unprofitable. Thus, to ensure the collusion-inducing  regime, the reward may
not be set above an upper level, which implies that cheating occurs with strictly positive
probability. In contrast, by letting the reward go to infinity, the collusion-proof  regime
is implemented and cheating only occurs with arbitrarily small probability.  It is this
latter difference  in cheating which causes the difference  in the principal's pay-offs  in the
two regimes.
4.2  Bounds  on  the  Reward
Now let us consider the case where penalties are unbounded, but the reward is bounded.
It is not difficult  to argue that in many contexts, a salary for civil servants which steeply
18depends on their success on catching potential cheaters is difficult to get accepted for
several reasons.  For instance, in Washington, D.C., New York, Oslo and other cities,
citizens have demanded change when too steep incentives  made issuers of parking tickets
overzealous. Also, for large government contracts possible bribes can be substantial,
so that  the rewards necessary to deter all collusion could be beyond the scope of a
government budget and a civil service employment contract.  On the other hand,  in
some countries, even minor offences  as petty theft can lead to a loss of limb, and in
China corruption may lead to death penalty. So, in the limit penalties can be thought
of as unbounded.
The problem which the principal is facing is similar to  (P1')  or  (P2') with  the
exception that  now the reward is bounded. Thus
max  Vp  = Up(an)  - -*[UP-AUAI  - A*C-  rC  (14)
s.t. r <r
r > Pg-7r(PA  + PS)  (NCC) or (CC)
where cr*  and jz*  are again given by eqs.(4) and (5) in the collusion-proof  case and by
eqs.(l0) and (11) in the collusion  case. The inequality of the last constraint depends on
whether the principal wants to implement the collusion-proof  (NCC) or the collusion-
inducing (CC) regime.
Note that  in the collusion-proof  regime, it is optimal to reduce 7r  as long as NCC is
19not violated. Solving NCC for ir yields
PAB  (15)
As we show in the Lemma 2 of the appendix, it is always optimal to set all penalties as
high as possible for both regimes. Thus, in the limit, the principal will let go all fines
to infinity. As the fines for bribery go to  infinity, it is clear that  the second term in
(15) vanishes while the first term will either stay constant, converge  to a constant, or
go to zero or infinity depending on how fines go to infinity. Since ir can only take on
values between zero and one, as the first term increases beyond one, then the regime
will necessarily be one of collusion.
Now, our result in this context can be stated as follows:
Proposition  2  For unbounded  penalties and a bounded  reward, a solution to the prin-
cipal's problem does not exist.
(a) Collusion-proof  regime: The principal's supremum pay-off is given by
VP =  Up(ad) -(/Up  - AUA)  (16)
This supremum can be approximated  arbitrarily  closely as PAC  -e  PA  - ° PSB  -e  °
and  PC-+*  0. Monitoring and investigating occurs with arbitrarily small probability
whereas cheating occurs with a positive probability which is determined by the upper
bound of the reward.
(b) Collusion-inducing  regime: The principal's supremum pay-off is given by
VP = Up(an)  (17)
20and can be approximated arbitrarily closely as PA  - oo.  Monitoring and cheating
occurs with arbitrarily  small probability  while investigation occurs with zero probability.
Hence, first best can be attained arbitrarily  closely.
Proof:
(a) Consider  first the  reward.  Since the  principal's  utility  increases monotonically  in r,
the  optimal  reward  must  be  equal  to  its  upper  bound.  A similar  argument  holds  for
Pc,  thus in the optimum,  it will go to infinity. However, to ensure  that  the NCC  holds,
bribing  penalties  will also have to go to infinity in a way that  A  <  1. Moreover,  if
the  penalty  for cheating  relative  to bribing  penalties  goes to zero, an  arbitrarily  small
probability  of investigation  will suffice to ensure collusion-proofness.  Hence, in the limit,
monitoring  and  investigation  do not occur.2 2
(b) Both  the equilibrium  probability  of monitoring  and cheating  decrease monotonically
in PA, thereby  raising the principal's  utility.  Thus in optimum,  the penalty  for cheating
will go  to  infinity.  Setting  7r =  0 ensures  collusion  is profitable  for  PC  >  r  while
investigation  costs are  zero.  An immediate  corollary  is the  following:
Corollary  2  The principal's expected  pay-off in the collusion-inducing  regime can al-
ways be made strictly higher than in the case of a collusion-proof  contract.
The intuition  is as follows: In the collusion-free regime, the  equilibrium  probability
of cheating  is determined  by the reward to the supervisor.  Since this  reward is bounded
by  assumption,  it  follows that  cheating  occurs  with  positive  probability  which  lowers
welfare  and  thus  the  principal's  utility.  In  contrast,  in the  collusion-inducing  regime,
221f for efficiency  or justice reasons beyond the scope of the model the  principal does not want to
let the  ratio  go to zero, additional investigation costs of 7r*c, would arise where 7r* is given by the
minimum amount of investigation necessary to ensure collusion-proofness.
21both  the probability of monitoring and cheating axe linked to the  cheating penalty
via the potential bribe.  Thus, as this penalty grows, so does the bribe which reduces
cheating and monitoring probabilities.
In the collusion-inducing  regime, the bribe is a subtle way of increasing the super-
visor's reward if his "official  reward" r is bounded for some reasons. Via the bribe, the
agent's cheating is lowered because otherwise the supervisor would find it profitable
always to monitor. This effect is identical to the one present in a collusion-free  regime
with an increased reward. In addition, an increased bribe also reduces the supervisor's
monitoring because otherwise the agent would never find it profitable to cheat.  This
second effect is similar to increasing the cheating penalty in the collusion-proof  regime.
The bribe thus plays a double function. A raise works like increasing the penalty  for
cheating and the reward to the supervisor at the same time.
5  Optimal  Contracts  with  Bounds  on  Penalties  and  the
Reward
So fax, we have considered  a number of special cases, namely that either penalties and/or
the reward can be made arbitrarily high.  However, under reasonable circumstances
(and we have made a case in the previous sections) both penalties and the reward to
the supervisor axe bounded. Therefore, it is interesting to derive the optimal contract
in such an environment. In particular, we are interested in whether the principal will
find it optimal to allow for some degree of collusion.
Consider first the optimal reward.  Inspecting the principal's objective function in
the collusion-proof  case, it is clear that  cheating decreases monotonically in r, so the
principal's utility increases monotonically in the supervisor's reward. In the collusion-
22inducing regime, both cheating and monitoring decrease in the reward again implying
monotonicity.
As the reward is increased gradually, it eventually reaches a level where collusion
becomes unprofitable. This is because at sufilciently high levels of r,  the bribe has to
be so high to compensate the supervisor for the foregone reward that  it is cheaper to
pay the cheating penalty. This "critical value" of r is defined by r = PC  - ir  (PA  + PSB),
i.e. the transition of the collusion-inducing  regime to the collusion-free  regime.
The principal's objective function is continuous in r  even at this  "critical value".
To see this, note that




r-+[PAC_7r(PAB+  PB)]  C
In words, at the critical value for r  where collusive behaviour becomes unprofitable,
equilibrium probabilities in the collusion-inducing  and the collusion-proof regime are
identical, ensuring continuity in the objective function.
Since the principal's objective function is continuous and monotonically increasing
in r for both regimes and continuous  at the point of transition, the optimal reward must
be equal to its upper bound regardless of the regime implemented.
A a similar argument holds for penalties.  In Lemma 2 in the appendix we show
that  optimal penalties are at their upper bounds irrespective of the regime. Again, it is
23easy  to  show that  monitoring  and  cheating  probabilities  in  the  collusion-proof  regime
converge  to  those  in  the  collusion-inducing  regime  as  the  cheating  (bribing)  penalty
attains  its  "critical value".  Hence the principal's  utility  is continuous  and monotonically
increasing in PA  (PA, PAS) over the entire domain.
Thus,  with  the  reward  and  penalties  given by their  upper  bound,  we only need  to
consider  the  change in the  principal's  objective  function  as 7r changes.
First,  similar  to above,  notice  that  as 7r is raised sufficiently, the  regime eventually
becomes  collusion-free.  This  is  because  a  higher  probability  for  detecting  collusion
increases expected penalties  for bribery  which will eventually  outweigh the gains.  Again,
the  principal's  objective  function  is continuous  in  7r.  Similar  to  above,  note  that  as
the  investigation  probability  approaches  its  "critical  value"  r  A-  ,  =
o9 1,  and  limni,,F p*  =  p.Again,  the  objective  function  is continuous  at  the  point  of
transition  of the  two regimes.
We have  thus  established  that  we only  need  to  examine  the  principal's  objective
function  as  a  function  of 7r, and  that  moreover  it  is continuous  in  the  investigation
probability.
Consider  first  the  collusion-proof regime.  The first derivative  of the objective  func-
tion  with  respect  to  7r is given by
avp =  ___  if  7F>P  7(PA  + PB)  (20)
Thus,  in an collusion-proof  environment,  the  marginal  utility  of an additional  "proba-
bility unit"  of investigation  is negative.  Since collusion does not occur, increased  7r does
not  yield any additional  benefits while causing additional  investigation  costs.  Thus  the
24optimal investigation probability in this environment is such that  agent and supervisor
are just  indifferent  between colluding or not.23
-C
PAc - r  g  (21) c  -B  -B
PA  +PS
Now consider the case where the principal wants to implement a regime which gives
rise to collusion. The first derivative with respect to 7r in the case is
rv =  C* k ('\UP-/\UA)  + /|Z*  (I  k CS]  (PB +  )-CP
_97  - AUA)  AU  A 2 1k~  (P  S  ih)  - Cp
if  C  <  PA-7r(pB  +  -)  (22) ~￿A-7(A+PS)
It  is easy to  show that  the second order conditions for a  maximum are fulfilled
for all values of 7r implying that  the objective function is strictly concave within the
collusion-inducing  regime.
Due to this latter property, it suffices to consider the first derivative at the point
of transition *.  If it is positive at this point, the optimal regime is collusion-free  and
n* =  Kr.  In contrast, if the slope of VP is negative at this point, the optimal regime is
one of collusion.
Evaluating the first derivative of VP at  r and reformulating yields
c3 -B  - A-B  -jjB\
---2k(AUP  - AUA)(PA  + PS)  +  CU2  (1 -k)cs(PA  + PS)  - Cp  (23)
The marginal utility of investigation at ir thus only consists of exogenously  given pa-
23Recall  that  we have assumed that in case of indifference,  the agent and the supervisor do what the
principal wants them to do. If they did not, an equilibrium would not exist in this case.
25rameters.  It is the sum of three terms, each describing three distinct effects. The first
term, which is negative, is the effect due to change of the equilibrium probability of
cheating. Cheating increases in 7r,  because a larger 7r raises expected fines which lowers
the gains from colluding. Thus, the direct impact of a higher investigation probability
is to reduce the supervisor's expected pay-off from monitoring.  To re-establish equi-
librium, the cheating probability must increase which in turn  reduces the principal's
expected pay-off.
The second term in eq.  (23) which is positive, is the effect due to monitoring, which
is declining in 7r. As ir increases, total  gains from collusion decline.  This decreases
the agent's expected profit from cheating. To re-establish equilibrium, the monitoring
probability must fall, which in turn raises the principal's expected pay-off.
Finally, the third term is simply the direct effect due to the higher cost of investi-
gation.
The principal's problem can be represented graphically:
26Optimal  Level of Investigation
VPI
Collusion-inducing  Regime -j-  Collusion-proof  Regime  -
vd'
.________  _________  __________  ___________  g  investigation
7r*(V3P)  0  7r*(VP)  ii =  7*(V]P)  7r=  1  probability  ir
The figure represents  three  alternative  scenarios for the principal's  expected  pay-off as a
function  of the  probability  of investigation  7r. The vertical  dashed  line separates  region
of  7r  in  which  the  agent  and  the  supervisor  collude  (to  the  left)  and  do  not  collude.
Thus,  if the  supervisor  chooses  7r <  *r, he induces  collusion, whereas  for 7r >  r ,  he
institutes  the  collusion-proof regime.  As pointed  out earlier,  within  the latter,  the prin-
cipal's  objective  function  is strictly  concave  in  ir while it  is linear  and  monotonically
decreasing  in the  collusion-proof  regime  (the slope is given by  -cp).  A priori,  it is not
clear which regime is optimal;  it depends  on the  parameters  as pointed  out above.  V1p,
V2P  and  V3P  illustrate  the  three  interesting  cases.  If the  marginal  utility  of 7r is strictly
positive  at  k as for V1P,  the  optimal  degree of investigation  ir*(VP)  =  fr, and  collusion
27does not  arise in equilibrium.  In contrast,  if the  marginal pay-off is negative  at  *, then
there  are two cases in which  collusion arises in equilibrium.  Either  we have an interior
solution  as depicted  by  2P, where the  optimal  level of investigation  is strictly  positive
(7r*(V2P)).  In the other  case, the  optimal  7r is zero as in case V!.
Using eq. (23), we are now able to interpret  under  which circumstances  it is optimal
for the  principal  to institute  a regime  which induces corruption.
First,  and  most  obvious:  The  higher the  costs  of investigation,  the  more  likely is
collusion in the  optimum.
-G Second,  the  higher  the  penalty  for cheating,  PA,  the  more  likely is the  collusion-
inducing  regime.  The higher the penalty  for cheating,  the larger the gains from collusive
behaviour  and  thus  the  equilibrium  probability  of monitoring.  This  implies  that  the
effect of 7r will be  smaller  since p* is monotonically  decreasing  and  strictly  convex  in
7r. Examining  eq.(23),  if the  beneficial effects of 7r in terms  of reduced  monitoring  is
small,  the two other  effects will dominate,  and  the marginal  utility  of 7r at  * is negative.
Thus,  7r will be set at  a  lower level, inducing  collusion.  Using a  similar  argument,  one
can  show that  higher r  makes collusion less likely.
Third,  the  higher the social loss from cheating  (AUp - AUA) relative  to the  agent's
gain  from  cheating  (AUA),  the  more  likely is  the  collusion-inducing  regime.  In  this
case,  it  is more  worthwhile  to  prevent  cheating.  The  effect  of raising  ir is to  reduce
the  attraction  of monitoring  and  thereby  to increase cheating.  Thus,  when social losses
from cheating  are high, it may be optimal  to choose the collusion-inducing  regime, since
greater  expected  bribes  increase  monitoring  and  thereby  lowers cheating.
Fourth,  the  higher  the  penalties  for  bribery,  the  higher  are  the  indirect  costs  (in-
creased  cheating)  and  benefits  (reduced  monitoring)  of  7r.  If the  effect  on  cheating
28dominates, then this may reduce the optimal ir  to a level that induces collusion.
Fifth,  the higher the bargaining power of the supervisor, the  more likely is the
collusion-inducing  regime. In the extreme, suppose the supervisor can make a take-it-
or-leave-it offer, so that  k =  1.  In this case, the supervisor fixes the agent to being
just  indifferent between colluding or paying the fine for cheating. Examining eq.(23),
k =  1 eliminates the effect of 7r on monitoring, without which the marginal utility of
investigation is negative. This is because as 7r is raised, total gains from collusion are
reduced, but since the entire gains accrue to the supervisor, the agent will not be worse
off by higher investigation. Thus, the equilibrium probability of monitoring does not
change while the probability of cheating increases even more in ir implying that investi-
gation has only costs (direct and indirect). In this extreme case, the optimal ir  is even
zero.  In contrast, complete bargaining power by the agent makes the collusion-proof
regime more likely, but  does not in the limit ensure collusion proofness. For k =  0,
investigation only yields indirect benefits (reduced monitoring) while it still involves
direct costs, so the marginal utility can be positive or negative at r.
Finally, let us compare some of the model's predictions with real world observations.
This should not  be considered serious econometric evidence, but  examples that  may
provide support for our assumptions and predictions.
We assumed that the principal can commit ex-ante to a probability of investigation,
and thus considered a Stackelberg structure.  Creating an independent anti-corruption
commission, such as the ones in Hong Kong or New South Wales, can perhaps  be
interpreted as a way of committing to a certain intensity of investigations. We know
from standard models  that the intensity of investigation will  be higher in the Stackelberg
case than in the (simultaneous move) Cournot case, and hence corruption will be lower
29in the presence of an independent commission. Actually, we find both  Australia and
Hong Kong have low corruption indices. According to the Transparency International
1998 Corruption perception index, out of 113 countries, Australia ranked 11 (4 places
ahead of Germany and 6 ahead of the USA), while Hong Kong ranked 16 (2nd best
country in Asia after Singapore and ahead of USA).
Singapore's top civil servants are among the best paid worldwide. Thus, Singapore
should be exceptionally placed to use promotions and salary increases to reward effort
and loyalty. In the context of our model, this corresponds to a high "reward", hence
we would expect the probability to observe corruption in equilibrium as relatively low.
Again using the Transparency International 1998 Corruption perception index, Singa-
pore ranks 7th and is thus the country with the lowest corruption index in Asia. 24
Going from country evidence to industry prose, two industries known for corruption
is gastronomy/catering trade  and construction.  In both,  a rationale for government
"approval" can be the need to protect the public from hidden quality flaws. When it
comes to complying with set standards, very often compliance cannot be measured in
objective and verifiable terms.  This scope for discretion corresponds to  a high bar-
gaining power of the supervisor our model. Therefore, we would expect the scope for
corruption to be great in these industries, in all countries.
24Notice that  we in this  argument associate pay increases at  promotions with rewards, the  general
civil service pay level is then irrelevant.  ff, in contrast,  loss of job or pension is interpreted  as  part
of a bounded  penalty for corruption, then  the general pay level is relevant  (see for instance Leite &
Weidmann [7])
306  Conclusions
We study the interaction between a principal who wants an action to be implemented,
an agent who may choose that  action or may cheat, and a supervisor who is hired to
monitor the agent's action.  We consider the principal's investigation of collusive be-
haviour between the agent and the supervisor as well  his choice  of penalties and rewards.
Through these choices,  the principal influences expected pay-offs  of the agent and the
supervisor and thereby effectively  decides whether they will collude (collusion-inducing
regime) or not (collusion-free  regime). Our model shows that investigation of potential
bribery has a strong impact on the incentives to cheat and to monitor. The mechanisms
differ in the two regimes. In the collusion-free  regime, the only function of investigation
is to  guarantee that  collusive behaviour is unprofitable by making expected fines for
bribery sufficiently  high. In contrast, in the collusion-inducing  regime, the intensity of
investigation affects the size of expected bribes and in turn influences optimal cheating
and monitoring.
If penalties and the reward to the supervisor are unbounded, the principal institutes
the collusion-proof  regime. Also, the probability of monitoring and cheating becomes
negligible, ensuring that first best can be attained arbitrarily closely. For a unbounded
reward and bounded penalties, the collusion-free  regime is still optimal.  In contrast,
for unbounded penalties and a bounded reward collusion arises in optimum.  In both
cases, the first best cannot be achieved, although in the latter case it can be attained
arbitrarily closely.
In the interesting case of bounds on both penalties and the reward to the supervisor,
the principal still has the option of preventing collusive  behaviour simply by engaging  in
31a sufficiently  high level of investigation. However,  it may be optimal not to do so. The
reason is that direct and indirect costs of additional investigation (through an increased
level of cheating) may outweigh the benefits (lower  level of monitoring).
Collusion in equilibrium depends on these bounds as follows. Collusion is more
likely the higher the penalty for cheating and the lower the reward for the supervi-
sor, the higher the gain to the principal relative to the losses of the agent from "No
Cheating", the higher the bargaining power of the supervisor and the higher the costs
of investigation.
A practical implication of our model is that  the presence of collusive  behaviour may
not be a  "policy error", but rather reflects an optimal policy in a constrained setting.
Our work gives some indications what  the relevant constraints are and thus  how to
improve the policy environment.
Our analysis highlights that corruption may occur in the pursuit of overall efficiency.
While corruption can be eliminated completely,  the model allows us to evaluate the costs
and benefits.
Clearly, the model is only a  first attempt  to  model the channels through  which
investigation by the principal may affect the behaviour of the other players. A number
of aspects has not been considered, and should be incorporated in subsequent research.
We consider the important insight of our model is that  within a framework of moral
hazard, it can be optimal for the principal to implement a scheme  with some corruption.
32Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (b):
Let us first derive the following  useful lemma:
Lemma  2  Optimal penalties  will be at their upper  bounds.
Proof. Consider the penalties for bribing first. By inspection of the objective function
of the principal and the equilibrium probabilities for cheating and monitoring, it is clear
that  bribing penalties always work in the same direction as does xr  with the exception
that  ir causes additional costs of c,.25 Therefore, it is clear that  if the principal wants
to induce a positive expected penalty for bribery, it is optimal for him to raise bribing
penalties to its maximum value and adjust the probability of investigation accordingly.
Now consider PA.  Since in the collusion-proof  regime  < 0 and in the collusion-
inducing regime  9  <  0 and  <  0, it is again straightforward to see that  the
optimal penalty  for cheating must be  at  the upper  bound regardless of the  regime
implemented.
Thus, the principal's maximization problem in the collusion-inducing  regime can be
simplified as follows:
maxVP  =  Up(a,)  - a*AUp  - \  UA  - tcS  -7rCP  (P2')
r,ir  C
s.t.  r < P-  -7r(  + iS )  (CC)
25This is despite the  fact that  in the  collusion-inducing  regime, the fine for the  principal and  the
agent have opposing effects on the  bribe paid.  While raising the agent's penalty  has a negative effect
on the bribe, a higher penalty for the principal raises the bribe.
33where
*  _  ~AUA
kPC  A + (1-k)  [7r(PA + PS)  + r]  (24)
and
*  _  ~~~~Cs
c =k[cPA  - 7r(PA  + P5)]  + (1-  k)r  (25)
The following  lemma will again proof useful:
Lemma  3  The optimal  reward in the collusion-inducing  regime is given  by
r*  =PA-7(P-+TP)  (26)
Proof:  Since  < 0  and  9  < 0, the optimal reward in the collusion case must be
as high as possible without preventing collusion. The highest possible reward is thus
given by eq.(26) since otherwise collusion  does not occur.
Now determine the optimal value for 7r: Let 0  pA  + P5,  then
=1r  -Ac  ZiU  < °  (27)
19i  - AUA
and
c9011*  = aC 2  k-  > O  (28)
2Wr  Cs
However, if the Collusion Constraint held with equality before, as 7r  increases the CC is
not fulfilled any longer. Due Lemma 3, the optimal reward must thus change in order
34to re-establish equality of the CC. The change is given by
dr*-  (29) d~7r
and
4  =-*2c (Ik)  < 0  (30)
(9r  0AUA
at* =  *2 (I - k) < 0  (31)
Hence,
dp* _9.*  9A*W  dr*
d7r  7r  Or  dir
=42  (1-k)W  +1  *2 (1 - k)  (  = o32)
Pc  AUA  C-  AAA
and
do,*  8f*  or*  dr*
d7r  di7r  ar d7r
= *2 kG +  a*2 (1  - k) 6  _  2  o
=o>  -+oc  0o  ->0  (33)
CS  Cs  Cs
Therefore, in optimum,
dVp  28
d1r-<  Cr  (/AUP- AUA)-CP  <  O  (34)
35This  implies that  7r* =  0.  The  intuition  is as follows.  The  principal  may  consider  a
marginal increment in the probability of investigation at  costs ep.  This  reduces the
equilibrium probability of monitoring and raises the probability of cheating for reasons
pointed out in the text.  At the same time, the condition which guarantees collusion is
not fulfilied  anymore, hence the reward must decline. This raises both  the probability
of cheating and monitoring.  The net effect on these two changes on the equilibrium
probability of monitoring is zero while it is positive on the equilibrium probability of
cheating.  Thus, as investigation costs and cheating go up, the principal's surplus is
unambiguously lowered by additional investigation.  Since this result holds for all 7r,
it must be the case that  in optimum, the principal does not monitor in the collusion-
inducing regime.
The principal's utility is thus given by
Vp = Up(a,)  - o*(AUp - AUA)  - ccs  (35)
Since in equilibrium, the CC is fulfilled  with equality, eqs. (24) and (25) simplify to
Ac =AUA  (36)
r  C
and
c= C  (37)
36and therefore
V;=  Up (a.)  - '  AUp  (38)
Comparing eq.(38) with eq.(13) reveals  that the expected gain for the principal is always
strictly smaller in the collusion-inducing  regime compared to the collusion-proof  case if
penalties are restricted since AUp > AUA by assumption. .
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